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SUMMERS V. ALTARUM: BROADENING THE DEFINITION
OF "DISABILITY" UNDER THE ADA, AND THE IMPACT
OF THE NEW DEFINITION ON EMPLOYERS
SIDNEY MINTER*
I. INTRODUCTION
Title I of the Americans with Disabilities Act of 1990 ("ADA") protects
certain qualified individuals with disabilities from discrimination in a pri-
vate workplace.' A qualified individual with a disability is someone who,
"with or without reasonable accommodation, can perform the essential
functions" of a job. 2 A person with a disability can include: (1) an individu-
al with a physical or mental impairment that substantially limits one or
more major life activities, (2) an individual with a record of such impair-
ment, or (3) an individual who is perceived as having such an impairment.
An impairment falls under the purview of the ADA if it "substantially limits
one or more major life activities." 4 The ADA applies to employers with
fifteen or more employees.s
In 2008, the ADA was substantively amended by the ADA Amendments
Act of 2008 ("Amended Act") which significantly changed the 1990 ver-
sion of the law.6 With this legislation, Congress substantially broadened the
definition of "disability." 7 This legislation has had a profound impact on the
types of impairments included under the coverage of the ADA.8 Congress
made these changes in response to a series of Supreme Court decisions
Congress believed improperly restricted the scope of the ADA. 9 The Sum-
mers Court was the first appellate body to apply the Amended Act's ex-
* Sidney Minter is an employment lawyer who enjoys writing and lecturing about interesting
employment-related legal issues. For questions or comments, please contact Mr. Minter by email at
sominter4@gmail.com.
1. See Americans with Disabilities Act of 1990, 42 U.S.C. §§ 12101-12213 (2012).
2. 42 U.S.C. § 12111(8) (2012).
3. 42 U.S.C. § 12102(1) (2012).
4. 42 U.S.C. § 12102(1) (2012).
5. 42 U.S.C. § 1211(5)(A) (2012).
6. ADA Amendments Act of 2008, Pub. L. No. 110-325, 122 Stat. 3553.
7. Summers v. Altarum Inst., Corp., 740 F.3d 325, 329 (4th Cir. 2014).
8. See ADA Amendments Act of 2008, Pub. L. No. 110-325, 122 Stat. 3553.
9. Id.
55
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panded definition of "disability."'0 Before the enactment of the Amended
Act and the subsequent Summers decision, an employee with an impairment
that was considered to be temporary (lasting less than six months) would
not be covered by the ADA."
Toyota Motor Manufacturing, Kentucky, Inc. v. Williams 2 was likely the
case that influenced Congress's 2008 amendments.' 3 Congress did not
agree with the Supreme Court's holding or analysis in Toyota with respect
to defining disability. 14 In Toyota, the United States Supreme Court adopted
a strict construction of the term "disability" and suggested that a temporary
impairment could not qualify as a disability under the Act.' 5 "Congress
believed that Toyota set an 'inappropriately high level of limitation neces-
sary to obtain coverage under the ADA."'"6 The passage of the Amended
Act, which led to abrogation of the Toyota decision, redefined "disability"
to apply to a broader range of individuals."
Section II of this article will detail the Summers decision, and how this
case has altered the way employers should handle future disability claims
under the ADA. Section III will focus on the definition of "disability" prior
to the Amended Act, including an in-depth analysis of Toyota and the rele-
vance of its holding. Section IV will then discuss the impact that the
Amended Act has had on the definition of "disability," and the impact the
Summers decision will have on injured workers' claims of disability pro-
spectively. Section V will present the issues of reasonable accommodations
and undue hardship as they relate to disability claims under the ADA. Fi-
nally, Section VI of this article will discuss the practical impact the Sum-
mers decision will have on employers.
II. THE CASE: SUMMERS V. ALTARUM
Summers arose from Carl Summers' appeal from the dismissal of his
complaint for failure to state a claim for which relief could be granted.' 8 In
July 2011, Summers began working as an analyst for Altarum Institute
("Altarum"), a government contractor with an office in Virginia.' 9 His job
required him to travel to different territories in order to conduct business.20
10. Id. at 330.
I1. Summers, 740 F.3d at 331.
12. 534 U.S. 184 (2002).
I3. Summers, at 329.
14. Id.
15. Id.
16. Id. (quoting Pub. L. No. 110-325, § 2(b)(5)).
17. Id. (citing 42 U.S.C. § 12102(4)(A) (2012)).
18. Id. at 327.
19. Id.
20. Id.
2
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In October 2011, while exiting a commuter train, Summers fell and injured
himself.2' During the fall, he fractured his left leg and tore the meniscus
tendon in his left knee. 2 2 He also fractured his right ankle and ruptured the
quadriceps tendon in his right leg.2 3 Summers' injuries were severe and
required two surgeries.24 His doctors restricted him from putting any weight
on his left leg for six weeks and estimated that he would be unable to walk
for at least seven months.25 Without surgery, bed rest, or other conservative
treatment, Summers alleged that he would likely have been unable to walk
for more than one year following the accident.26
While hospitalized, Summers contacted Altarum to inquire about obtain-
ing short-term disability benefits and developing a plan for gradually re-
turning to work.27 Summers suggested a plan in which he would receive
short-term disability benefits, and then start working remotely from home
on a part-time basis until he was ready to return on a full-time basis.28 Alta-
rum's insurance provider granted Summers' request for short-term disabil-
ity benefits. 29 However, Altarum did not follow up with Summers regarding
how he would return to work.30 Altarum did not suggest reasonable ac-
commodations, nor did it advise Summers that there was a problem with his
proposed plan to return to work.3 ' Instead, in November 2011, Altarum
terminated Summers' employment and hired another analyst to replace
him. 32
Summers filed a complaint in the Eastern District of Virginia alleging
two claims under the ADA.33 In his first claim, Summers alleged that Alta-
rum discriminated against him because of his disability and that he was
wrongfully terminated. 34 In his second claim, Summers asserted that Alta-
rum failed to accommodate his disability.3 5 In response, Altarum filed a
Rule 12(b)(6) motion to dismiss as to both of Summers' claims.36 The dis-
trict court granted Altarum's motion without prejudice. A few months
21. Id.
22. Id.
23. Id.
24. Id.
25. Id.
26. Id.
27. Id.
28. Id.
29. Id.
30. Id.
31. Id.
32. Id. at 328.
33. Id.
34. Id.
35. Id.
36. Id.
37. Id.
3
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later, Summers filed a new suit essentially making the same allegations
against Altarum that he made in his first complaint.3 8 The district court
granted Altarum's motion to dismiss as to both claims, with prejudice.39
Summers appealed, challenging the court's dismissal of his wrongful dis-
charge claim. 40
The Fourth Circuit analyzed Summers' contention that he was disabled
as a result of the work-related incident.4 1 Summers alleged that the incident
left him unable to walk for seven months, and that without surgery, he
would have been unable to walk for even longer.42 The Court held that
Summers' injury was "sufficiently severe" to qualify as a disability.4 3 The
Court ultimately held that a temporary impairment, when sufficiently se-
vere, can constitute a disability for purposes of satisfying the ADA.44
III. BACKGROUND
Before the Amended Act and the Summers decision, the term "disability"
had very restrictive definition. 45 The Court in Toyota made clear that a per-
son with a temporary impairment could not be a "qualified person" under
the ADA. 4 6 This bright-line rule simplified the claims-handling process for
employers.47 A person with an impairment that is sufficiently severe to
qualify for coverage under the ADA could include: (1) an individual with a
physical or mental impairment, (2) an individual with a record of such im-
pairment, or (3) an individual who is regarded as having such impairment.48
Once a court determines that an employee is disabled, the court must then
determine whether this impairment substantially limits one or more of the
employee's major life activities. 49
The phrase "substantially limits" was intended to be interpreted broadly,
to encourage broad application of the ADA. 50 Before the enactment of the
Amended Act, the term "major life activities" included certain activities
such as walking, speaking, breathing, seeing, hearing, learning, and work-
ing.i' The implementation of the Amended Act expanded the list to include
38. Id.
39. Id.
40. Id.
41. Id. at 330.
42. Id.
43. Id.
44. Id. at 331.
45. Id. at 329.
46. Id.
47. See Toyota Motor Mfg., Ky., Inc. v. Williams, 534 U.S. 184 (2002).
48. 42 U.S.C. § 1201(1) (2012).
49. Summers, 740 F.3d at 331.
50. 29 C.F.R. § 1630.2(j) (2013).
51. 29 C.F.R. § 1630.2(i) (2009).
4
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reading, bending, concentrating, and communicating, as well as the func-
tioning of each of the systems of the body.
In 2002, the Supreme Court decided Toyota, which interpreted the ADA
rules regarding disability before the Amended Act was passed. Ultimately,
the Court held that a person with a temporary impairment could not receive
coverage under the ADA.54 The temporary impairment issue was the central
issue in Summers,55 and is likely to substantially impact employers going
forward.56
In Toyota, Ella Williams worked for Toyota Motor Manufacturing
("Toyota") in its automobile manufacturing plant in Kentucky. 7 Williams
worked on an engine fabrication assembly line, where her duties included
work with pneumatic tools.s8 Eventually, Williams began experiencing pain
in her hands, wrists, and arms. She sought treatment for her conditions in
Toyota's onsite medical facility and was ultimately diagnosed with carpal
tunnel syndrome.60 Williams' treating physician assigned permanent work
restrictions that precluded her from lifting more than twenty pounds.6 In
light of her restrictions, Toyota accommodated Williams by placing her in
modified-duty positions over the next two years of her employment.62
Williams continued working for Toyota, but missed some time from
work for medical leave, and eventually filed a workers' compensation
claim. 63 Williams settled her workers' compensation claim and returned to
work in a new department-Quality Control Inspections Operations ("Qual-
ity Control").64 In her new role, Williams was required to open and shut the
doors, trunk, and hood of each passing car on an assembly line; she was
also expected to wipe each car with a glove as it moved along the convey-
or.65 There was no dispute regarding the fact that Williams was able to per-
52. 29 C.F.R. § 1630.2(i) (2013) ("Major life activities include, but are not limited to.... [t]hc
operation of a major bodily function, including functions of the immune system, special sense organs
and skin; normal cell growth; and digestive genitourinary, bowel, bladder, neurological, brain, respirato-
ry, circulatory, cardiovascular, endocrine, hemic, lymphatic, musculoskeletal, and reproductive func-
tions. The operations of a major bodily function includes the operation of an individual organ within a
body system.")
53. Toyota Motor Mfg., Ky. Inc. v. Williams, 534 U.S. 184 (2002).
54. Id. at 198.
55. See generally Summers v. Altarum Inst., Corp., 740 F.3d 325, 329 (4th Cir. 2014).
56. This article focuses solely on the Court's analysis of the disability issue, not the wrongful
termination issue.
57. Toyota, 534 U.S. at 187.
58. Id.
59. Id.
60. Id.
61. Id.
62. Id. at 188.
63. Id.
64. Id.
65. /d. at 188-89.
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form these tasks in a satisfactory manner.66 During the fall of 1996, Toyota
announced that members of the Quality Control team would be required to
apply oil to the hood, fender, doors, and trunk of passing cars at a rate of
one car per minute.6 ' This new position in Quality Control was the "shell
body audit" job. 8 Shortly after Williams began working in this position,
she began experiencing neck and shoulder pain. 9 She went to a doctor and
was diagnosed with multiple ailments involving inflammation of the mus-
cles and tendons around both her shoulder blades, and nerve pains in her
upper extremities.7 0
There was then a factual dispute between Williams and Toyota regarding
her employment status.7 Williams argued that Toyota would not allow her
to return to her original position in Quality Control, while Toyota contend-
ed that Williams began missing work on a regular basis.72 On the last day
Williams actively worked for Toyota, her physician placed her under a "no
work" restriction.7 3 Approximately one month later, Williams was termi-
nated from employment with Toyota.
Shortly thereafter, Williams filed a complaint against Toyota alleging
that Toyota violated the ADA by failing to reasonably accommodate her
restrictions and wrongfully terminating her employment." Williams con-
tended that she was disabled under the ADA because her physical impair-
ment substantially limited her ability to perform major life functions.76 The
district court ruled against Williams, holding that she was not disabled..n
She appealed to the Sixth Circuit Court of Appeals, which reversed the dis-
trict court's ruling in part, finding that Williams was disabled at the time
she sought reasonable accommodations.78 Williams appealed to the Su-
preme Court, which granted a writ of certiorari.79
The Toyota Court focused its analysis on the nature and severity of Wil-
liams' impairment.80 The Court reasoned that "[w]hile cases of severe car-
66. Id. at 189.
67. Id.
68. Id.
69. Id.
70. Id.
71. Id.
72. Id.
73. Id. at 190.
74. Id.
75. Id.
76. Id.
77. Id.
78. Id. at 191 (The Sixth Circuit Court of Appeals affirmed the district court's ruling on Williams'
wrongful termination claim.).
79. Id. at 192.
80. Id. at 196.
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pal tunnel syndrome are characterized by muscle atrophy and extreme sen-
sory deficits, mild cases generally do not have either of these effects and
create only intermittent symptoms of numbness and tingling."81 The Court
noted that "[s]tudies have further shown that, even without surgical treat-
ment, one quarter of carpal tunnel cases resolve in one month, but that in
[twenty-two] percent of cases, symptoms last for eight years or longer." 82
The Court reasoned that given the wide disparity in the severity and dura-
tion of carpal tunnel syndrome, an individual's diagnosis, standing alone,
does not indicate whether a person is disabled.83 The Toyota ruling estab-
lished that short-term or temporary impairments were excluded from cover-
age under the ADA because such impairments did not substantially limit a
84major life activity. This was the standing rule until the 2008 Amendments
were implemented.
The 2008 amendments abrogated the ruling in Toyota.86 By passing the
amendments, "Congress directed the Equal Employment Opportunity
Commission ("EEOC") to revise its regulations defining the term 'substan-
tially limits' to render them consistent with the broadened scope of the
[Amended Act]."8 The EEOC issued regulations to clarify that the term
"substantially limits" was intended to be a lax standard that facilitated ex-
pansive protection for injured workers.88 The most important part of the
Amended Act, as it relates to defining "disability," is the EEOC's regula-
tion providing that "effects of an impairment lasting or expected to last
fewer than six months can be 'substantially limiting' for purposes of prov-
ing an actual disability."89 "According to the appendix to the EEOC regula-
tions, the 'duration of an impairment is one factor that is relevant in deter-
mining whether the impairment substantially limits a major life activity."'90
"Although '[i]mpairments that last only for a short period of time are typi-
cally not covered,' they may be covered if they are 'sufficiently severe."'91
81. Id. at 199.
82. Id.
83. Id.
84. Id. at 198.
85. See, e.g., Sullivan v. Neiman Marcus Grp., Inc., 358 F.3d I 10 (1st Cir. 2004).
86. Summers v. Altarum Inst., Corp., 740 F.3d 325, 329 (4th Cir. 2014).
87. Id.
88. Id. (citing 29 C.F.R. § 1630.2(j)(1)(i) (2013)).
89. Id. (emphasis in original) (quoting 29 C.F.R. § 1630.2(i)(1)(ix) (2013)).
90. Id. (quoting 29 C.F.R. app. § 1630.2(j)(1)(ix) (2013)).
91. Id. (cmphasis in original) (quoting 29 C.F.R. app. § 1630.2(j)(1)(ix) (2013)).
2014] 61
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IV. ANALYSIS
The Summers Court went to great lengths to justify its holding regarding
the expanded definition of the term "disability." The Court found that the
district court erred by holding that Summers' temporary injury could not
constitute a disability as a matter of law.92 The Fourth Circuit noted that the
district court erred by relying on cases decided prior to the implementation
of the Amended Act and misapplying the Amended Act's disability analy-
sis. 93 "The [district] court reasoned that because Summers could have
worked with a wheelchair, he must not have been disabled under the
Amended Act.9 4 The district court inverted the appropriate inquiry by ex-
amining whether Summers could have worked if he was allowed to use a
wheelchair, before determining whether there was in fact a "substantially
limiting impairment." 95 The determination of whether Summers could have
worked with the assistance of a wheelchair was important, but applied to a
different issue - whether reasonable accommodations were appropriate -
which was not the focus of the disability analysis the court was purporting
to address.
By prematurely considering whether Summers could have worked with
reasonable accommodations, the district court erroneously made a determi-
nation as a matter of law that Summers' temporary injuries could not con-
stitute a disability.9 7 The decision as to whether an impairment is substan-
tially limiting "shall be made without regard to the ameliorative effects
of. . . reasonable accommodations."9 8 In other words, the courts must con-
clude whether a person is disabled before deciding whether reasonable ac-
commodations are appropriate. If the employee is not disabled, the ADA
does not apply, and the legal analysis ends there.
The Summers Court decided that adopting the district court's disability
analysis would, in effect, eviscerate the ADA. 99 Adopting this analysis
would place employers in an unfair position each time an employee -
whether disabled or not - claimed to be disabled for purposes of the ADA.
Under the district court's analysis, employers would be forced to search for
reasonable accommodations for every worker who claims to be disabled.
The district court's analysis raised many questions regarding the application
92. Id. at 330.
93. Id.
94. Id. at 330-31.
95. Id. at 331.
96. Id.
97. Id. at 330-31.
98. Id. at 330 (quoting 42 U.S.C. § 12101 (4)(E)(i)(ll) (2012)).
99. Id. ("If the fact that a person could work with the help of a wheelchair meant he was not disa-
bled under the Act, the ADA would be eviscerated.").
8
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and workability of the standard for disability. Would employers be able to
avail themselves of defenses such as undue burden? What about the unnec-
essary costs employers would sustain while developing appropriate "rea-
sonable accommodations" for employees who might not even be disabled?
After establishing that a temporary impairment can qualify as a disabil-
ity, the Summers Court then focused its attention on whether the EEOC's
interpretation of "disability" was reasonable. 00 The Court stated that the
EEOC's decision to include "severe temporary impairments" in the defini-
tion of "disability" "advances [the] goal" of the Amended Act to expand the
scope of protection available under the ADA.' 0 ' "Furthermore, the EEOC,
pursuant to its delegated authority to construe 'disability' more generously,
adopted new regulations providing that an impairment lasting less than six
months can constitute a disability."' 0 2 The Court noted that short-term im-
pairments only qualify as disabilities if they are "sufficiently severe."10 3
The Court reasoned that the Amended Act's inclusion of temporary disa-
bilities advanced the goal of expanding protection under the ADA. 0 4 The
Court discussed the burden on employers, and determined that the burden
would endure only as long as the disability endures because "[tiemporary
disabilities require only temporary accommodations."' 05 Ultimately, the
Court held that Summers' injury fell "comfortably within" the purview of
the broadened definition of "disability."' 6 The Court held that "becatise
Summers allege[d] a severe injury that prevented him from walking for at
least seven months, he ha[d] stated a claim that his impairment 'substantial-
ly limited' his ability to walk," which is a major life activity.1 07
V. REASONABLE ACCOMMODATIONS AND UNDUE BURDEN
One of the stated purposes of the ADA is "to provide a clear and com-
prehensive national mandate for the elimination of discrimination against
individuals with disabilities."'08 The term "discriminate" under the ADA
encompasses "not making reasonable accommodations to known physical
or mental limitations of an otherwise qualified individual with a disabil-
ity." 09 It is generally the disabled individual's responsibility to inform the
100. Id. at 332.
101. Id.
102. Id. at 330 (citing 29 C.F.R. § 1630.2(j)(1)(ix) (2013)).
103. Id. (citing 29 C.F.R. app. § 1630.2(j)(1)(ix) (2013)).
104. Id. at 332.
105. Id.
106. Id. at 333.
107. Id.
108. 42 U.S.C. § 12101(b)(1) (2012).
109. 42 U.S.C. § 12112(b)(5)(A) (2012).
2014] 63
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employer of his need for an accommodation. "0 When requesting an ac-
commodation, an individual may use plain English and need not mention
the ADA or use the phrase "reasonable accommodation.""'
Once an employee makes a request for a reasonable accommodation, the
employer is expected to respond as quickly as possible.1 2 The regulations
anticipate that a request will trigger "an informal, interactive process with
the qualified individual with a disability in need of the accommodation.""
This procedure is designed to give the employee and employer an oppor-
tunity to sit down and communicate regarding the request for reasonable
accommodations.1 4 "This process should identify the precise limitations
resulting from the disability and potential reasonable accommodations that
could overcome those limitations.""'5 This is a two-way interactive process;
thus, the employee "must participate in order to retain the ADA's protec-
tions."' 16
An employer does not need to provide a reasonable accommodation to an
employee if doing so would result in an undue hardship to the employer. '1
An undue hardship is defined as "significant difficulty or expense" incurred
by the employer, when considered in light of several statutory factors."'
Those factors include:
(i) the nature and cost of the accommodation requested;
(ii) the overall financial resources of the employer involved in the
provision of the reasonable accommodation; the number of per-
sons employed at such facility, the effect on expenses and re-
sources, or the impact otherwise of such accommodation upon
the operation of the facility;
(iii) the overall financial resources of the covered entity, the overall
size of the business of the covered entity with respect to the
number of employees, the number, type and location of its facili-
ties; and
110. 29 C.F.R. app. § 1630.9 (2013).
111. See, e.g., Schmidt v. Safeway Inc., 864 F.Supp. 991, 997 (D. Or. 1994) ("The [ADA] does not
require the plaintiff to speak any magic words before he is subject to its protections. The employce need
not mention the ADA or even the term 'accommodation."')
112. Frederick M. Thurman, Jr., FMLA/ADA: The Basics 16 (June 7, 2013) (unpublished manu-
script) (on file with the North Carolina Bar Association Continuing Legal Education Department).
I 13. 29 C.F.R. § 1630.2(o)(3) (2013).
I 14. Robin Shea, II Employer FAQs: (No. i) What Exactly is this "Interactive Process'" We Hear
so Much About?, EMPLOYMENT AND LABOR INSIDER (Aug. 26, 2011), http://www.cmploymentand
laborinsider.com/americans-with-disabilities-act/1 I -employer-faqs-no- I-what-cxactly-is-this-interactive
-process-wear-hear-so-much-about/.
115. 29 C.F.R. § 1630.2(o)(3) (2013).
116. See Thurman, Jr., supra note 112 (manuscript at 16).
117. 42 U.S.C. § 12112(b)(5)(A) (2012).
118. 42 U.S.C. § l2111(10)(2012).
10
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(iv) the type of operation of the covered entity, including the compo-
sition, structure, and functions of the workforce of such entity,
the geographic separateness, administrative, or fiscal relationship
of the facility or facilities in question to the covered entity.119
VI. PRACTICAL IMPACT
After Summers, employers should consider making serious changes to
their claims-handling protocol. In Summers, the Fourth Circuit was clear in
broadening the definition of disability; however, the Court was not clear
with respect to defining what constitutes a "sufficiently severe" impair-
ment.1 20 This uncertainty raises questions about how the broadened defini-
tion of "disability" affects the reality of running a business or being a part
of the workforce. What kind of temporary impairments will be "sufficiently
severe" to qualify for ADA coverage? How temporary can the condition
be? Can a severe condition of only a few days qualify? Logically, it is rea-
sonable for each district court to decide this issue on a case-by-case basis
because the analysis is fact-specific.
From a claims-handling perspective, Summers will make it increasingly
difficult for employers to refute an employee's contention that he or she is
disabled - even if the condition is temporary. To avoid costly penalties,
employers will need to treat employees with temporary conditions as quali-
fied individuals receiving ADA protection.121 This will significantly in-
crease the number of employees who are considered disabled under the
ADA. Employers will need to shift their focus away from deciding whether
an employee is disabled in order to establish methods for reasonably ac-
commodating these individuals.1 22 Employers should focus on developing
protocols for providing reasonable accommodations and medical leaves of
absence.1 2 3 If nothing else, employers must remember that engaging in an
interactive process with the employee is very important. In fact, it is so im-
portant, that in certain jurisdictions, failure to do so is considered a viola-
tion of the ADA.1 24
119. Id.
120. Summers v. Altarum Inst., Corp., 740 F.3d 325, 329 (4th Cir. 2014).
121. Robin Shea, 5 Employer Lessons from ADAAA "Temporary Injury" Decision, EMPLOYMENT
AND LABOR INSIDER, (Jan. 29, 2014), http://www.employmentandlaborinsidcr.com/americans-with-
disabilitics-act/wc-told-you-so-adaaa-protects-even-temporary-injuries/.
122. Id.
123. Id.
124. See Shea, supra note 121.
2014] 65
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The Court's decision in Summers reinforces the individual and fact-
specific nature of assessing whether an employee has a disability.1 25 "Fac-
tors that employers should consider in making such a determination in-
clude:
How difficult it is for the individual to perform the major life
activity?
How much time does it take the individual to perform the major life
activity?
Does the individual experience pain when performing the major life
activity?
For what time period can the individual perform the major life
activity?
How does the impairment affect the operation of a major bodily
function?
Does the individual experience negative side effects of medication
taken for the impairment?
Is the treatment regimen required for the impairment burdensome?1 26
This process can be difficult and may require consultation with legal
counsel.1 27
Although the Summers decision will likely have a major impact on the
employers' claim-handling processes, there is still hope that employers will
be able to avoid costly penalties. These penalties can include compensatory
and punitive damages, as well as equitable relief.128 Summers broadens the
definition of disability in cases where an employee claims that he has an
"actual disability." 29 Conversely, an impairment that is "transitory," "mi-
nor," and lasts less than six months is not protected under the ADA if an
employee alleges that he is "regarded as" having a disability.1 30 That said, if
an employee contends that he has an "actual disability," employers should
treat his claim - temporary or otherwise - as they would a permanent
disability claim, if it satisfies the "actual disability" prong of the ADA.
Handling claims in this manner should help employers avoid costly penal-
ties imposed by the EEOC.
1 25. Katie Goctzl, Fourth Circuit Rules of Temporary Impairment May Be a Disability Under the
ADAAA, ASAP (Jan. 28, 2014), http://www.littler.com/filcs/prcss/pdf/2014_1lASAPFourthCircuit
Rules_Temporary Impairment May_bc_Disability Under_ADAAA.pdf
126. Id.
127. Id.
128. Remedies For Employment Discrimination, U.S. EQUAL EMPLOYMENT OPPORTUNITY
COMMISSION, http://www.ccoc.gov/cmployers/rcmedies.cfm (last visited Oct. 25, 2014).
129. William Goren, Temporary Disabilities and the ADA (Feb. II, 2014), http://www.william
gorcn.com/blog/2014/02/11/temporary-disabilities-ada/.
130. I.
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VII. CONCLUSION
Summers is a landmark decision that has changed the landscape of disa-
bility claims. The broadened scope of what constitutes a disability will
change how employers handle claims, as well as increase the number of
claims filed. The practical impact of this decision will become clearer as the
case law continues to develop. Although there is no way to know how the
case law will develop, employers should take proactive steps to ensure that
they are best protecting themselves from a broader base of potential claims
under the ADA.
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